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. . 
IN THE SUPRE.ME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF U,Tl\H 
. ' . ·. . . ,. .. -._ 
UTAH FUNERAL DIRECTORS & . EMBAI..MEn.s . ·l _,·· 
· · ASSOCIATION, a Utah corporation, on beha:lf 
of its members, and on behalf of others similarly 
situated, - · 
Plaintiffs - Appellant, 
-Vs.-
MEMORIAL GARDENS OF THE VALLEY~ INC.~ 
a Utah corporation; MEMORIAL TRU$TS; INC., . . . Case , .. 
a Utah corporation; LAKE . HILLS, a Utah .cor- • No. 10236 
poration; AULTOREST MEMORIAL CORPORA-
TION, a Utah corporation; HAL S. BENNETT, 
DONALD HACKING and RAYMOND W. GEE, 
members of the Business Regulation Commission 
of the State of Utah; and VIRGIL L. NORTON, . 
Commissioner of Insurance of the State of· Utah; 
Defendants - Responqents 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF: .· 
. ,;·_ .· 
-~ · . .' _:,·. : 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This was an action in th~ Lower Court' seeking a De-
claratory Judgment · requ~s.tj,~g that certain Business 
Practices of the .Corporate . D:ef.end~nts be d~c~~r:ed jl-
legal; that those Business 'Practices 1.nvolved: violations 
' i · ' · ·. · . · -~ . .". i · . I · : : . . ·' · . ' ' : ' : ' ' . · . · f! 
·of :professional and ethical con.duct regulations for : Erri-
~almers and Funeral Directors a.s: ·provided for in ·s·ec-
tions 58-9-10, and 22 of .the Utah Code_ A~notated ·.l953 · 
. ' " . • .· . . . . . .. . . ' . · . .' ' 
and also violations of :the so-called · Pre-need law a.s con-
tained in Section 22-~~4, Chapter 39, Laws of Utah 1955 
. 1 
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and as amended in Chapter 45, Laws of Utah 1957. Plain-
tiffs further sought a declaratory Judgment decreeing 
that the p:re-need contracts (R. 8-12, 19-20 and 39-41) 
issued and sold by the Defendants, and through their as-
sociates, are insurance contracts, in consequence of which, 
said Contracts and the Defendants would .be subject to 
the Insurance Regulations of the State of Utah super-
vising said Contracts as Insurance Contracts and said 
Defendants as Insurance Companies. This Court is re-
q nested to determine the issues of this case from the 
pleadings in the Record of the lower Court, and the copies 
of the pre-need contracts and affidavits, also that part of 
the Record which is either part of the pleading'S or which 
has been made part of the record otherwise (R. 8-12, 
19-20, 39-41 a.nd 35). 
In this case it is necessary that the Plaintiffs, and it 
should be of interest to the Defendants, to know the le-
gality of the practices complained of. The corporate De-
fendants carry on activities which vitally affect every 
mortician and funeral director in the state and leave such 
morticians and funeral directors in a dilemma. 
If in fact the practices are legal, then it is essential 
that the various morticians and funeral directors· cooper-
a.te under one or more of the plans carried on by the de-
fendants or a similar plan by some other company; if 
they fail to do so they will suffer a competitive disadvan-
tage which will directly · and detrimentally affect the 
business which they carry on. In fact, it is not too much 
to say that if the business practices carried on by the 
corporate defendants are legal, within the not too distant 
2 
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future the vast majority of funerals conducted in the 
State of Uta4 will be conducted pursuant to financing 
plans instituted by one of these defendants or someone 
else in a similar business. Therefore, any mortician or 
funeral director that did not cooperate in such a plan 
might find it difficult to continue to exist. 
On the other hand, if such plans are illegal, the Plain-
tiffs might well, if they cooperate in such plans, find them-
selves guilty of unethical c.onduct and find their license 
subject to revocation. 
The Plaintiffs, therefore, seek a Construction, and a 
determination of the validity and legality, of the p·rac-
tices complained of, and the Contracts before the Court. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This Case was brought before the Lower Court for 
a Determination of the issues on a Motion for a Sum-
mary Judgment (R. 32-35) asking for a declaration: 
(a) That a licensed Embalmer or Funeral Director 
performing services pursuant to a pre-need contract ob-
tained by solicitation is guilty of unprofessional and un-
ethical conduct as defined in Sections 58-9-10 and 22 of 
U 0 A 1953 and subject themselves to a possible revoca-
tion of their license. 
(b) That pre-need contracts providing future fu-
neral services such as those used by the Defendants are 
insurance contracts and are not legally issued unless the 
company issuing the same qualifies as an insurance com-
pany under the insurance laws of Utah. 
3 
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· (c) That pre-need contracts are in violation of law 
unless they provide' that' all the earnings and interest on 
monies paid in shall be held in trust until death of bene-
ficiary and 'paid to no other person but the named payor 
as provided in Sections 22-4-1 to 22-4-7 as enacted hy 
Chapter 39, Laws of Utah 1955 and as amended in Chap-
ter 45, Laws of Vtah 1957. 
The matter was argued before the Court without 
'introduction of further evidence. The Defendants raised 
the. issues of, and challenged (a) the constitutionality of 
portions of the pre-need law in Title 22, Chapter 4, 
Supra; and (b) whether or not there was a justiciable 
issue between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants and be-
fore the Court and the capacity of the party Plaintiffs 
to sue. 
The lo"rer Court denied the Plaintiffs' motion for 
Summary Judgment; decided in favor of the Defendants 
on their claim that certain portions of the pre-need law 
are unconstitutional; and found in favor of the Plaintiffs 
declaring that the Plaintiffs had legal standing to prose-
cute the action and that there existed a justiciable issue 
between the Plaintiffs and Defendants. 
The Plaintiffs respectfully refer the Court to the 
final decree of the lower Court as contained in the lower 
Court's Record on file herein (R. 44-48). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
A review is hereby sought from this Honorable Court, 
under the Plaintiffs' rights of appeal, of the decision of 
4 
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the lower Court. The Plaintiffs feel that the lower Court 
~rred i~ its decisions in the particulars set out by the 
Plaintiffs in their Statement of Points which f?llow and 
s~ek a reversal of the lower. Court's decision on those 
points. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. 
THAT CONTRARY TO THE COURT'S DE-
CISION, ANY FUNERAL DIRECTOR OR 
EMBALMER, WHO PERFORMS FUNERAL 
SERVICES OR FURNISHES BURIAL FA-
CILITIES PURSUANT TO A PRE-NEED 
CONTRACT OBTAINED BY SOLICITATION 
BY EITHER OF THE DEFENDANTS, SO-
LICITED OR SOLD BY AND FOR THEM-
SELVES,· OR WHICH RESULTS TO THE 
BENEFIT OF A FUNERAL DIRECTOR OR 
EMBALMER WHO PERFORMS THE FU~ 
NERAL SERVICES OR FURNISHES THE 
BURIAL FACILITIES, IS GUILTY OF UN-
PROFESSIONAL AND UNETHICAL CON-
DUCT AS DEFINED IN SECTIONS 58-9-10 
AND 58-9-22 OF THE UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED, 1953 .. 
II. 
THAT CONTRARY TO THE LOWER COURT'S 
DECISION, THE CONTRACTS SOLD BY THE 
DEFENDANTS ARE ALL SUBJECT TO THE 
PRE-NEED LAW OF UTAH, AND.THE CON-
TRACT USED AND ISSUED BY THE DE-
FENDANT, ME:M:ORIAL TRUST,· INC., IS 
PARTICULARLY IN VIOLATION O:Ir THE 
5 
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PRE-NEED LAW OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AS CONTAINED IN SECTION 22-4-4, CHAP-
TER 39, LAWS OF UTAH, 1955 AND AS 
AMENDED IN CHAPTER, 45, LAWS OF 
UTAH, 1957, AND THAT SAID DEFEND-
ANTS' PRE-NEED CONTRACT PARTICU-
LARLY PERMITS SAID DEFENDANT TO 
DEMAND AND RECEIVE THE EARNINGS 
OF THE TRUST FUNDS AND PAY SAID 
FUNDS TO SAID DEFENDANT CONTRARY 
TO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID SECTION 
22-4-4 AFORESAID. 
III. 
THAT CONTRARY TO THE LOWER COURT'S 
DECISION, THE PRE-NEED CONTRACTS, 
BEING SOLD BY THE DEFENDANT COM-
pANIES AND WHICH ARE THE SUBJECTS 
·oF THE CONTROVERSY IN THIS CASE, 
ARE INSURANCE CONTRACTS AND SUB-
JECT TO THE INSURANCE LAWS OF THIS 
STATE AND THEREFORE, SUBJECT TO 
REGULATION BY THE UTAH STATE IN-
SURANCE DEPARTMENT, AND THAT THE 
SAID DEFENDANT COMPANIES, ISSUING 
SAID CONTRACTS ARE ALSO SUBJECT TO 
THE INSURANCE LAWS OF UTAH AND 
THE REGULATIONS OF THE STATE IN-
SURANCE DEPARTMENT OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH. 
IV. 
THAT CONTRARY TO THE LOWER COURT'S 
DECISION, THOSE PORTIONS OF SEC-
TIONS 22-4-1 22-4-2 22-4-4 22-4-5 AND 22-4-7 
' ' ' OF THE PRE-NEED LAW OF THE STATE 
6 
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OF UTAH, CHAPTER 39 OF THE 1955 LAWS 
OF UTAH AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 45 
OF THE 1957 LAWS OF UTAH AND WHICH 
SECTIONS ARE QUOTED IN THE LOWER 
COURT'S AMENDED JUDGMENT OF DIS-
MISSAL, DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 1964 
(R. 46) ARE CONSTITUTIONAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT CONTRARY TO THE COURT'S DE-
CISION, ANY FUNERAL DIRECTOR OR 
:JTIMBALMER, WHO PERFORMS FUNERAL 
SERVICES OR FURNISHES BURIAL F AGIL-
ITIES PURSUANT TO A PRE-NEED CON-
TRACT OBTAINED BY SOLICITATION BY 
EITHER OF THE DEFENDANTS, SOLICIT-
ED OR SOLD BY AND FOR THEMSELVES, 
OR WHICH RESULTS TO THE BENEFIT OF 
A FUNERAL DIRECTOR OR EMBALMER 
WHO PERFORMS THE FUNERAL SERV-
ICES OR FURNISHES THE BURIAL F AGILI-
TIES, IS GUILTY OF UNPROFESSIONAL 
AND UNETHICAL CONDUCT AS DEFINED 
IN SECTIONS 58-9-10 AND 58-9-22 OF THE 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
Those portions of Sections 58-9-10 and 58-9-22 of the 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 that are pertinent to this 
Appeal read as follows: 
58-9-10: ''The words 'unprofessional conduct' 
as relating to embalming are hereby defined to in-
clude:* * * 
(7) Solicitation of dead human bodies by a. 
registered apprentice or licensed embalmer, or 
7 
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their agents, assistants or employees, whether 
such solicitation occurs before or after death • • • 
(8) Employment, :directly or indirectly, of atny 
app·renlice, agent, assistant, embalmer, employee, 
or other person, on part or full time or on commis-
sion, for the purpose of calling upon individuals 
or institutions by whose influence · dead human 
bod.ies may be· turned over to· a p·artic'ldar mortu-
. ary establishment, funeral director, or embalmer; 
provided this provision shall not he deemed to pre-
vent and prohibit the solicitation for sale of 
crypts, burial lots or cremation services by a li-
censee or his. employee. 
( 9) The buying of business by the licensee, his 
agents, assistants or employees, or the direct or 
indirect payment or offer of payment of a commis-
. sion by the licensee, his agents, assistants or em-
ployees for the purpose of securing business; or 
the direct or indirect giving or offering to give 
any bonus, or gift for the purpose of securing 
business. 
58-9-22: The words ''unprofessional Conduct'' 
a.s they relate to this act, are hereby defined to 
include : * * * · 
(c) Solicitation of funeral business by the 
licensee, his agents, assistants or employees, 
whether such solicitation occurs before or 
after death * * * 
(d) Employment by the licensee of per-
sons known as ''capers'' (cappers) or ''steer-
ers'' or ''solicitors'' or other such persons to 
obtain funeral directing or embalming busi-
ness . 
. (e) Employment, directly or indirectly, 
of amy apprentice, agen.t, assista;nt, embalmer, 
ernployee or other person, on part or full time, 
8 
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or on commission, for the purpose of calling 
upon individuals or institutions by w·hose in-
fluence dead bodies may be turned over to a 
particular funeral director. • * * 
(f) The buying of business by the li-
censee, his agents, assistants or employees, or 
the direct or indirect payment . or offer of 
payment of a commission, bonus ·or gift by 
the licensee, his agents, assista;nts or employ-
ees for the purpose of securing business.'' 
(Emphasis added) · 
Regardless of the way in which it might he said, the 
purpose of such statutes in the various states is, to elimi-
nate unnecessary commercialization of death; to curtail 
any practice that resembles competitive bids for dead 
bodies ; and to generally denounce and label as unpro-
fessional and unbecoming, the solicitation of dead bodies 
for _burial except by accepted and approved methods 
of general advertising. 
A determination of this question will decide whether 
or not funeral directors and embalmers are going to be 
permitted to raise themselves to the status of a profes-
sion, or whether they are going to be governed by the 
more relaxed rules of open and cut-throat competition 
with its many flagrant abuses and fraudulent practices. 
These laws have been upheld as constitutional and are 
supported in one form or another by most, if not all, 
states. 
The Defendants are contending that they do not op-
erate directly as either a Funeral Director or an Em-
9 
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balmer, and that they are not subject to the unprofes-
sional conduct statutes herein referred to. That they are 
free to solicit, negotiate, sell, and perform all the com-
mercial a<}ts related to the solicitation of dead human bod-
ies prohibited to funeral directors and embalmers a.s evi-
denced by the pleadings in this case and the contracts of 
every Defendant of record in this case. They all prom-
ise to furnish, among other things, a complete funeral, 
embalming and interment, either through their own fa-
cilities, or the facilities of licensed funeral directors and 
embalmers of the State~ (R. 8, 9, 12, 19, 40 rear side) It 
is interesting to note the efforts of the Defendants to 
disengage themselves from the effect o~ the Statute when 
in actual practice they are engaging in all the essential 
activities of funeral directors and embalmers or selling 
for themselves or selling their services to licensed fu-
neral directors and embalmers of the State of Utah. If 
they are not acting as a funeral director or an embalmer, 
they c.an 't possibly escape the relationship of being 
either ''agents, assistants, employees, cappers, steerers, 
solicitors, or other persons'' on part or full time, or on 
commission, for the purpose of calling upon individuals 
so a.s to have the dead human bodies turned over to them-
selves or a particular funeral director even though he 
is later to be designated. (Sec. 58-9-10 (8) and 58-9-22 
(e) U C A 1953 quoted above) The violation, and the 
evil, is in acts of solicitation which are intended to bene-
fit, and do result in benefiting, licensed funeral directors 
contrary to the statute. The evil is not less vile, less un-
ethical, nor less evil because it is committed by the 
defendants. 
10 
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Note that Defendant, Memorial Gardens of the Val-
ley (R 8) as the ''Company," agrees to do every act done 
by a. licensed funeral director and embalmer. If they 
were licensed· as funeral directors they could not solicit. 
Why should they be allowed to do so for themselves or 
others just because they have no license. 
Defendant Memorial Trusts, Inc., agree to provide 
everything that goes with a funeral. They agree that 
such services are "to be performed by a listed Mortuary 
or other Mortuary'' selected by the heirs of the de-
ceased. (R. 9) This is also the Agreement ofthe Defend-
ant Aultorest Memorial Corporation, who agree to 
''cause a complete funeral'' to be conducted at their 
expense. ( R. 12) 
Note that Defendant Lake Hills also agrees to a com-
plete funeral but that those ''funeral services can only 
be performed by a mortuary authorized by Lake Hills." 
(R. 40 rear side) Again the Defendants urge full rights 
to violate the unprofessional conduct statute even though 
they are openly and conspicuously soliciting either for 
themselves or licensed funeral directors. They claim im-
munity only because they are not licensed as funeral 
directors or embalmers. 
If a licensed embalmer or funeral director violates 
the provision against solicitation, his license is subject 
to revocation. The question here to be- determined is 
whether or not funeral . directors and embalmers being 
themselves prohibited from soliciting may, through sub-
terfuge, enjoy the fruits of solicitation. . It appears that 
ll 
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the corporate defendants find themselves in a dilemma 
in regard to this matter. If in fact they are qualified 
themselves to render the services as embalmers or fu~ 
neral directors, they certainly are in direct violation of 
the statute if they solicit. If they themselves are unable 
to render the s·ervices in question, the sale of an agree:. 
:inent automatically makes them subject to the insurance 
code, as we : will discuss in a later succeeding section, 
but does not relieve the licensed funeral directors or 
embalmers with whom they do business of the obligation 
to observe the ethical standards of his profession. If in 
fact those of the corporate defendants who are not quali~ 
fled to render embalming or funeral directing services 
have a pre-existing agreement, however informal it may 
be, with any licensed embalmer or funeral directors that 
such licensed embalmer or funeral director, or one to be 
named or designated later, will render the services con-
tracted for by such Defendant, then the Defendant be~ 
comes the agent or representative of the funeral director 
or e-mbalmer so concerned, and while the Defendants 
claim the ethical rules of the profession would not affect 
the Defendant sales company, it 'vould affec-t the licensed 
embalmer or funeral director for \vhom they purport 
to act. 
The Plaintiffs maintain the Defendants are all vio-
lating the unprofessional conduct statute above quoted 
because of their acting as agents, employees and repre-
sentatives of the particular licensed funeral director and 
embalmer involved. That by a relationship such as this, 
they also jeopardize the license of the licensed funeral 
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director. The Defendants' case is an admission they are 
soliciting, but they want immunity. The Plaintiffs, in this 
appeal, do not contend that the Defendants are under an 
express contract of appointment with any licensed fu-
neral_ director in the State of Utah, with arrangements 
for direct payments of compensation, through commis-
sions or otherwise. The Plaintiffs do claim that that 
which is illegal and forbidden to be accomplished di-
rectly, cannot be legal if accomplished indirectly. The 
Defendants have elected to put themselves in the posi-
tion of giving and providing to any licensed funeral 
director, who will accept benefits under, and who will 
agree to carry out their contracts indirectly, the full ben-
efits of the very acts of solicitation, which the licensed 
funeral directors and embalmers are otherwise prohibited 
to practice or turn to his benefit, whether by his own 
acts or the acts of his agents or employees. 
One thing is certain, that the Pre-need Contracts of 
the Defendants, already referred to in this case, are not 
the simple contracts made between two parties where 
Party A assumes burdens for which he is re.sponsible on 
the one hand and Party B in consideration thereof, 
assumes burdens for which he is responsible on the 
other. 
It is equally as certain that even though the con-
tracts in question purportedly are between A and B 
parties, these contracts do have the distinctive additional 
feature of providing that a third party, namely a licensed 
funeral director and embalmer in the State of Utah shall 
be~ the party to carry out and perform the provisions of 
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the pre-need contract of the defendants. At the time the 
Contract is consumated, both of the original parties 
contemplate and state in open, express terms that ali-
censed funeral director and embalmer shall, upon elec-
tion, and if willing, be the performing party. The buyer 
knows he must look to someone beyond the Defendants 
(agent) to get what he has purchased. (Restatement of 
the Law, 2nd Edition, Agency, Section 85, p. 217.) 
This is agency by ratification. In this latter situa-
tion which is the case before the Court, we find all the· 
elements necessary to create that relationship. 
The first essential to the relationship is that the 
Agent has no authority to bind his principal. In our 
cases the Defendants set out in their contracts 'Yhat the 
funeral directors will do but this does not bind the fu-
neral director because the inclusion of the funeral di-
rectors is unauthorized. (Sec. 208 of Agency, . Vol. 2, 
American Juris prudence) When the funeral director 
is later selected and agrees to perform, he is bound to the 
contract as written by the defendant and is subject to 
every provision in the contract and every rule applicable 
to the relationship of ratification by a principal. 
The funeral director or embalmer, if and when he 
agrees to go ahead (ratify), has no right to change the 
terms without consent and must accept the contract 
terms as written. This acceptance or ratification by the 
funeral director makes the acts of the Defendants in sell-
ing the contract, the act of the funeral director as though 
the funeral director himself had created the contract 
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in the beginning. (See Moses v. Arch. McFa.rla.nd & Sons 
(Utah 1951), 119 Utah 602 ; 230 Pac. 2nd 571, 573 ; also 
Yellow Jacket Boat Co. v. Little Glasses Corp. (Okla. 
1959), 338 Pac. 2nd 1105). 
Any funeral director that accepts, and agrees to 
perform, even though he. has been merely described, or 
listed as one of a specific group, causes his '' ratifica-
tion" and his obligation to perform to be equally as 
binding as though he had been named and identified by 
name. Agency law does say there must be an identifica-
tion of the principal to have agency by ratification. In 
Restatement of the Law on Agency, 2nd Edition, Sec-
tions 85 and 87, we read as follows : 
85. Subsection 1 (c) Principal Unidentified: 
It is not necessary that the purported principal 
be identified; it is sufficient that the person acting 
should purport to act as agent for another, but if 
he describes the other by name or otherwise, only 
a person coming within the description so given, 
if any, can ratify. If the description applies to 
two persons equally, only the one on whose aceount 
he intends to act can ratify. 
87(a)-* * * If he (the acting person) identi-
fies the purported principal, it is only the affirm-
ance of such person which can result in rati:fiea-
tion. * * * if a partial description is given, only a 
person who comes within it and who was intended 
by the person can ratify-* * * 
Plaintiffs maintain the Defendants are, under these 
rules, agents of the funeral director or any other persons 
who perform under their contracts and are therefore 
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subject to the unprofessional conduct laws referred to on 
solicitation. What is further serious, such actions jeop-
ardize the position of the funeral director and make 
them also violators and subject to the loss of their li-
censes under the provisions of the la:ws referred to be-
cause they become liable as if they had been in on the con-
tract from the beginning and must take the burdens as 
well as benefits.-
It is obvious that the Defendants are doing all they 
can to avoid being called agents. In reality they do pur-
port to act for another (the funeral director). The rela-
tionship they create, with its resulting obligation and 
rights, determines what that relationship amounts to, 
rather than their explanations of wha.t they hope they 
are doing, whether written or oral. In situations border-
ing on undisclosed principals, and situations where the 
acting party actually involves a third party, as in the 
ca.se before the Court, but avoids calling him a principal, 
and tries to make it appear he is acting for himself 
rather than a.s an agent, as the Defendants are trying 
to do here, the majority of Courts are holding it as 
agency by ratification. (See Barnett Bros. v. Lynn (Wn. 
· '22), 203 Pac. 389; also the classification identified as· a 
class five in 22 Columbia Law Review, p. 467.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II. 
THAT CONTRARY TO THE LOWER 
COURT'S DECISION, THE CONTRACTS 
SOLD BY THE DEFENDANTS ARE ALL 
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SUBJECT TO THE PRE-NEED LAW OF 
UTAH AND THE CONTRACT USED AND IS-
SUED BY THE DEFENDANT, MEMORIAL 
TRUST, INC., IS PARTICULARLY IN VIOLA-
TION OF THE PRE-NEED LAW OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, AS CONTAINED IN SEC-
TION 22-4-4, CHAPTER 39, LAWS OF UTAH, 
1955 AND AS AMENDED IN CHAPTER 45, 
LAWS OF UTAH, 1957, AND THAT SAID DE-
FENDANTS' PRE-NEED CONTRACT PAR-
TICULARLY PERMITS SAID DEFENDANTS 
TO DEMAND AND RECEIVE THE EARN-
INGS OF THE TRUST FUNDS AND PAY 
SAID FUNDS TO SAID DEFENDANT CON-
TRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID SEC-
TION 22-4-4 AFORESAID. 
Utah's pre-need statute was enacted by the 1955 Leg-
islature. The purpose of the act was to regulate the 
selling of funeral services and personal property used 
in connection with the burying of the dead p-rior to the 
time that the need for such arises, and to require the 
companies selling such services to place the monies re-
ceived in trust. The pu~pose, of course, is to protect 
the individuals who purchase the services, and to make 
sure that the money to pay for the same will be avail-
able when the need arises. Section 22-4-1, U. C. A. 1953, 
states: 
''Payments for pre-arranged funeral plans 
constitute trust funds - Decedent beneficiary -
Trustee, - Any payment of money made to any 
person, firm or eorporation upon any agreement 
or contract, or any series or combination of 
agreements or contracts, which has for a p·ur-
pose the furnishing or performance of funeral 
services, under a pre-arranged funeral plan, or 
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the furnishing or delivery of any personal prop-
erty, ·merchandise, or services of any nature, but 
exclud.ing cem.etery lots, vaults, crypts, n,iches, 
cemetery burial privileges, an.d cemetery space, in 
connection with the final disposition of a dead hu-
man body, for future use at a time determinable 
by the death of the person or persons for whose 
benefit any such agre·ement has been made and 
whose body or bodies are to be disposed of, such 
deceased person to be known in this act as the de-
cedent beneficiary, shall be held to be trust funds, 
and the person, partnership, association or cor-
poratiQn receiving such payments is hereby de-
clared to be a trustee thereof.'' (Emphasis added) 
The purpose of the exemption set forth in the itali-
ciz.ed words above was obviously to exempt the sale of 
such items as are covered by Chapter 4, Title 8, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, regarding cemeteries. It, there-
fore, a.pp·ea.;rs that Sec. 24-4-1 was intended to include all 
items used in connection with the burial of the dead 
which are not subject to provisions of Chapter 4, Title 
8. The contracts of the defendants provide for full fu-
neral services including embalming. They also provide 
for caskets and other personal property used in con-
nection with the burial of the dead. However, so long as 
they do not come within the category of crypts or vaults, 
they are clearly within the pre-need statute regardless of 
'vhether or not the individual can take delivery if he so 
chooses when he completes payment, but before he dies. 
It cannot be overemphasized that the purpose of the 
pre-need law is to guarantee the presence of moneys and 
their preservation to the time when the funds will be 
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needed. Protection is afforded against insolvency of the 
person entrusted with the funds, against his going out of 
business and even his death; against fraud, theft and 
even arrangements of any and all kinds, legal, fraudulent 
or otherwise which permits said trust funds to be de-
leted, diverted, shared or otherwise used by others than 
the beneficiaries protected by the pre-need law. 
The very simple fact persists that the defendants 
are receiving payments from others for the purposes set 
out in Section 22-4-1 U.C.A. 1953 as set out above. There-
fore, the Plaintiffs insist that the only consistent posi-
tion is, that the Defendants must deposit those collected 
funds in trust as p-rovided in said pre-need law. 
Defendant MEMORIAL. TRUSTS, INC., does de-
posit their funds in trust while the others claim them-
s~lves exempt. 
The objection to the Memo.rial Trusts contract (R. 9) 
under the pre-need statute is that the purchaser appoints 
Memorial Trusts, Inc., as its ''agent to demand and re-
ceive earnings of the trust fund and to pay the same to 
itself in exchange for and in consideration of the agree-
ment of Memorial Trusts, Inc., to guarantee the services 
and facilities above set forth regardless of future price 
increase.'' That this provision constitutes a contract of 
insurance "\vill be discussed in a. later section. However 
. ' 
it also quite clearly offends against the provisions of Sec. 
22-4-4, U.C.A., 1953, which provides in part as follows: 
''All payments and amounts so deposited, with 
all earnings and interest thereon, shall not be 
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withdrawn until the death of the sole or one of the 
beneficiaries, * * *. ' ' 
A provision in the contract, therefore, to the effect that 
Memorial Trusts, Inc., has the right to withdraw the 
earnings on deposit and pay it to itself, is in clear con-
tradiction of the statute. Either the law is in effect or it 
isn't if its purposes are to be accomplished. Imagine 
someone accepting deposits of money from groups of 
individuals and trying to make himself exempt from the 
Banking, the Insurance or the Securities Laws by merely 
getting a waiver from the Depositor. The pre-need law 
is affording equal protection in its field and is entitled 
to equal consideration and enforcement. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT III 
THAT CONTRARY TO THE LOWER 
COURT'S DECISION, THE PRE-NEED CON-
TRACTS, BEING SOLD BY THE DEFEND-
ANT COMPANIES AND WHICH ARE THE 
SUBJECTS OF THE CONTROVERSY IN 
THIS CASE, ARE INSURANCE CONTRACTS 
AND SUBJECT TO THE INSURANCE LAWS 
OF THIS STATE AND THEREFORE, SUB-
JECT TO REGULATION BY THE UTAH 
STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, AND 
THAT THE SAID DEFENDANT COMPAN-
IES, ISSUING SAID CONTRACTS ARE ALSO 
SUBJECT TO THE INSURANCE LAWS OF 
UTAH AND THE REGULATIONS OF THE 
STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT OF 
THE STATE .OF UTAH. 
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The Plaintiffs represent that the Defendant com-
panies, Memorial Gardens of the Valley~ Inc., Memorial 
Trusts, Inc., Lake Hills, and the Aultorest Memorial Cor-
poration, are all selling insurance contracts. These con~ 
tracts are being sold primarily as p·re-need contracts pro-
viding for funeral benefits under such titles as benevo-
lent funds, trust funds, and funeral benefits. The. Plain-
tiffs maintain these contracts are all subject to the insur-
ance laws of the State of Utah; that the sellers of such 
contracts should qualify and be licensed as insurance 
companies under the insurance laws of the state of Utah; 
and that such contracts should also be qualified and ap-
proved as insurance contracts as the state law provides. 
None of the Defendant companies listed above has quali-
fied before, nor have any of them received permission 
from the Utah State Insurance Commissioner to oper-
ate as an Insurance Company. 
A general proposition in all governmental control 
and regulation is that all states exercise regulatory con-
trol in all cases where any person, corporate or natural, 
takes another's money and either uses it or exercises 
control thereover. .A..ll of these possibilities are en-
compassed in and under either the banking and finance 
la,vs, the la'v of investments, or insurance laws. If some-
one takes another's money for any purpose outside the 
field of sales and transfers, he fails under some regulation 
set up for one or more of those three named categories. 
Any type of organization that takes over the control of 
another's money and tries to a.void qualifying under one 
of those three groups, opens the 'vay for fraud, misuse 
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of funds, and other losses to the individual which is not 
in the public interest. 
The named defendant companies are accepting, and 
controlling the funds of others without meeting the safe-
guards set up by Utah law. The Plaintiffs specifically 
point out that these named defendant companies are sell-
ing insurance contracts, and should, at least, be required 
to qualify as insurance companies. 
Section 31-5-2 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
provides: 
( 1) ''No insurer shall transact any insurance in 
this state other than as surplus lines insurer, ex-
cept that author1zed by a valid and existing cer-
tificate of authority issued to it by the commis-
sioner.'' 
Our Utah State Insurance Department is charged 
with the enforcement of the Insurance Laws. (Sec. 31-2-1, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953.) 
The contracts of the Defendant companies on file 
in this case (R. 8-12, 19, 20, 39-41), and which were either 
submitted, or have been admitted as being used, by the 
said Defendant companies, vary in some minor respects 
as to the benefits promised, but the Plaintiffs desire to 
point out certain pertinent similarities common in all 
of the contracts involved herein. All of these contracts 
promise to deliver, at some unknown future date, certain 
funeral merchandise as yet unidentified, and funeral serv-
ices at the time a death occurs, or on demand, which can 
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only be interpreted as also after death. We later desire 
to·point out the law in reference to this matter. All con-
tracts on file herein being issued by the Defendant com-
panies agree to furnish caskets, clothing, embalming 
services, funeral services, transportation, and grave serv-
ices, including vaults in most contracts. Every contract 
involved herein agrees to obtain the services of another 
funeral director, or any of certain listed funeral directors 
to perform the funeral services. All of these contracts 
provide for refunds upon demand. 
Defendant, Memorial Gardens of the Valley, Inc., 
also .agrees to provide endowment care and bronze tab-
lets or memorials (R. 8). 
Defendant, Memorial Trusts, Inc., further agreed to 
provide plastic surgery when necessary and musicians 
(R. 19). This Defendant also specifically provides for an 
appointment from the purchaser so that said Defendant 
company can act as an agent to receive and hold monies 
for the benefit of the purchaser to be used in providing 
the funeral benefits 'vhen death occurs (R. 9 and 19). This 
makes the contract strongly and definitely a contract 
of insurance. 
In substance, these Defendant companies agree to 
take and hold, or in other ways keep control of the funds 
of another until death occurs, and the benefits are needed 
for a funeral. We submit that these are the elements 
of life insurance. 
There are innumerable Supreme Court decisions 
holding these types of contracts as insurance contracts. 
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The Plaintiffs desire to point out specifically that in all 
of these Supreme Court cases no distinction is made be-
tween, and it makes no difference to the Courts, whether 
these contracts are sold by and through a funeral di-
rector, or whether by and through an association, agency, 
or a company which is separate and op·erates apart from 
one or more funeral directors. 
Section 31-1-7 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
defines Insurance as follows: 
''Definition of Insurance - Insurance is a con-
tract whereby one undertakes to pay indemnity, 
or pay a specified amount, upon determinable 
contingencies.'' 
Insurance is further defined in 44 C. J. S. under In-
surance, Sec. 1, page 4 71, a.s follows : 
'' * * * Insurance denotes a. contract by which 
one party for a compensation * * * assumes par-
ticular risks of the other party, and promises to 
pay to him, or his nominee a. certain, or ascer-
tainable sum of money on a specified contingency; 
an agreement by which one party for a considera-
tion promises to pay money, or its equivalent, or 
do some act of value to the insured, on the de-
struction or injury of something in which the lat-
ter has an interest.'' 
See also 29 .Am. Jur. on Insurance, Section 3, page 433. 
In the case of State (by the Attorney General) v. 
Mutual Mortuary Association, Inc. (Tenn. 1933), 61 S.W. 
2d 664, an association was involved writing contracts 
promising a complete burial at one of several listed 
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prices. The Court in that case listed and followed nu-
merous cases from several jurisdictions and said : 
''As to t;he first co~tention, we think the business 
is clearly insurance. The contract evidenced by 
the certificate has all of the elements of a life in-
surance contract. It is an agreement to perform 
a service which can become obligatory only on the 
death of the certificate holder. While no bene-
ficiary of the promisee is named, in reality one 
exists; and may be ascertained with as much cer-
tainty as if directly and specifically named. It is 
the person who would otherwise be obligated to 
pay the expenses of the burial. This may be the 
heir of the estate of the decedent, his relatives, or 
the state; but, whoever such person may be, he is 
relieved of his obligation to the exent of the value 
of the service agreed to be performed by the terms 
of the certificate. There is, therefore, a promise 
by one person to perform a valuable service on 
the death of another, a valuable consideration paid 
for the promise, and a person to whom the benefit 
of the promise 'vill inure. Had the ordinary in-
surance nomenclature been used to designate the 
person making the promise, the person to "\\"hom 
the promise is made, the person "\Vho will receive 
the benefit of the promise, and the consideration 
paid for the promise, no one "\vould question that 
it was an insurance contract. But a contract is 
to be determined from its nature and effect, not 
by the terminology used to characterize it. I-Iere 
is an ''insurer'' an ''insured,'' a ''premium,'' 
and a ''beneficiary,'' and we think the contract 
nothing else than a plain, ordinary insurance con-
tract.'~ 
''Our statutes, which provide for the regulation 
and oversight of insurance companies and their 
agents were designed to protect policyholders 
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against fraud, imposition, insolvency, and misap-
propriation of funds. Industrial policies espe-
cially are frequently issued to persons who' are 
poor, illiterate, improvident, and unable to pro-
tect themselves.'' 
In the case of Sisson, by the Attorney General, v. 
Prata Undertakin,g Company (Rhode Island, 1928), 141 
Atl. 76. The Defendant was selling contracts providing 
for complete funeral services including furnishings, ma-
terials, casket and other funeral necessities, all for a 
regular payment of money. The Court in that case held 
that the contract was an insurance contract, and stated: 
''Burial Insurance is a contract based upon a le-
gal consideration whereby the obligor undertakes 
to furnish the obligee, or his near relatives, at 
death, a burial reasonably worth a fixed sum.'' 
Please note that in all of these cases already quoted, 
and to be quoted, the sellers of these contracts have called 
them by various names, such as : ''leases,'' ''options,'' 
''benevolent funds,'' ''discount contracts,'' ''trusts,'' 
''notes,'' and other titles to which the Courts have paid 
no attention as pointed out in the case above from Ten-
nessee. The Courts are not concerned with the con-
tracts' names if the elements of insurance are present. 
In Sta,te (by the State Insurance Commissioner) v. 
Stout (Tenn. 1933), 65 S.W. 2d 827, 829, the defendant 
who was operating a burial society "'"rote contracts pro-
viding for funeral benefits, funeral furnishings, and a 
complete funeral outfit to be furnished by and through 
de signa ted undertakers. The Court also held this as an 
.26 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
insurance contract subjecting the company to qualify 
under the State Insurance laws, and held as follows : 
'' * * * It is also declared that the business which 
the society or company is actually carrying on, 
and not the mere form of the organization, is the 
test for determining whether an insurer is a bene-
fit society or insurance company so as to be with-
in a statute applying to insurance companies. 
Again, that the status of an association or so-
ciety is fixed by the character of the business 
transacted, and not by the mere formal 'vorkings 
of the organization. So it has been said that the 
rights of persons claiming under a contract must 
be fixed thereby without regard to the character 
of the society. And, if the prevalent purpose be 
that of insurance, the existence of benevolent or 
charitable features does not affect the legal status 
of an insurance company.'' 
In a more recent case, State (by the State Insurance 
Commissioner) v. Mynatt Funeral Home (Tenn. 1960), 
339 S.W. 2d 26 the Defendant funeral home agreed to fur-
nish all necessary merchandise and funeral services on 
demand, or on death. The Court held this contract to be 
one of insurance, and pointed specifically, commenting on 
the fact that in twenty years of activity the Defendant 
had issued 35,000 contracts, and allowing a $500.00 bene-
fit on each, calculated that under a discount provision 
the Company would have a liability of $8,750,000.00. 
Then the Court said as follows: 
''It is evident that 'vith this tremendous poten-
tial liability, there should either he adequate pro-
vision for substantial reserves, or the la,vs of the 
State should make it impossible for surh a sit-
uation to exist.'' 
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The Plaintiff ·feels tha.t it would be burdensome to 
the C.ourt to quote any further cases, but many others·, 
could he given. Each one of the cases referred to in this 
Brief cites many. other cases from ·several juridictions. 
The· Plaintiff would, however, like to refer the Court to 
the following cases where complete burial equipment 
and funeral services were promised. They were held 
insurance contracts in every case ; See : 
Capitol Hill Burial .Association V·. Oliver 
(Okla.1939), 91 P. 2d 673 
Gua~rdian Burial Association v. Rodgers 
(Tex. 1942), 163 S.W. 2d 851 
Ken.ton & Campbell Benevolent Burial Association 
v. Goodpastor (Ky. 1946), 200 S.W. 2d 120 
Renschiler v. The State, by the Attorney General 
(Ohio, 1914), 107 N.E. 748 
· State v. Globe Casket a.nd Underta,king Company 
(Wash. 1914), 143 Pac. 878 
Many further cases are also accumulated and to be found 
in 63 A.L.R. 723; 100 A.L.R. 1453, and 119 A.L.R. 1243. 
The Contracts of the Defendant Companies now be-
fore the Court make no special, or any reference to 
death. These Contracts either provide specially, or, at 
least, imply that the goods and services can be demanded 
a.t any time. This type of provision has been a problem 
with the Courts and has been discussed in many cases. 
May we refer you to a couple of such cases, and the de-
cisions of the Courts. 
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In the case of South Georgia Funera.l Home v. Har-
rison (Ga. 1936), 184 S.E. 875. The Funeral Home was 
selling Option Contracts agreeing to provide ''caskets,'' 
"vaults," ''clothing," and other merchandise. * * * 
"services of an Undertaker," "ambulance," and "hearse 
services.'' 
The Court held this a Contract of Insurance, and 
said: 
''While the exercise of the Option is not expressly 
made contingent upon the death of any of them, 
the merchandise and the services may be bought 
only for the use of, or in connection with the 
'' Optionees'' their minor children, or dependents. 
As a general proposition, we cannot conceive of 
what use a casket, (burial clothes, funeral direc-
tions, etc.) would be to a. living person not en-
gaged in the business of buying and selling such 
commodities. Burial merchandise, and funeral 
services are peculiar commodities ; they are pre-
sumably used only in connection with, or for use 
of, a person who has departed from life.'' 
Therefore, the Court held the contingency of death 
was sufficiently operational and held it insurance, and 
not to be sold unless the company became licensed as an 
Insurance Company. 
In the case of State, by the Attorney General, v. The 
Smith Funeral Service (Tenn. 1940), 145 S.,V. 2nd 
1021, the Defendant funeral director had a charter from 
the State to operate a funeral parlor, and to operate a.n 
undertaking business, and to operate a· cemetery. They 
proceeded to sell contracts providing for caskets, a 
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hearse, funeral clothes, and other funeral benefits. They 
had no death provisions as we have in our contracts be-
fore the Court. This company, also, manufactured and 
sold caskets outright. Demand could also be made at 
any time for the benefits of the Contract. The Court held 
these Contracts insurance, and held that they could not 
be sold in the State of Tennessee unless the Defendant 
qualified as an insurance company, and, otherwise, met 
the insuranee laws of the State. The Court proceeded 
and said as follows : 
''As suggested by the chancellor, only a rare and 
eccentric individual would in person, or through an 
agent purchase for himself a coffin and grave 
clothes before· he died. Human nature is such that 
the individual revolts at acquiring and possessing 
during his lifetime such gruesome tokens of his 
end. A person not abnormal would not have such 
things around him during his lifetime. 
Even though the Contracts could be matured before 
death the Court said further : 
"We are further of the opinion that the Defend-
ant (Funeral Home) never contemplated in the 
issuance of these Contracts that they would be 
matured until the certificate holders died. * * * 
furnish hearse service * * * handle details inci-
dent to a funeral, very plainly show that the De-
fendant (Funeral Home) was contracting in rev-
erence to death.'' 
It is very obvious that the discussions on the Defend-
ants' pre-need contracts, whether under Point III on the 
Plaintiffs' claim that they are insurance, or whether un-
der Point IV supporting the constitutionality of the pre-
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need law, that many arguments and decisions would over-
lap. May we point out that in a couple of citations being 
used primarily to discuss Point IV on the constitutional-
ity of pre-need contracts, the opportunity is taken by the 
courts to also point out that pre-need contracts are basi-
cally insuranee contracts. This Court is referred to the 
preliminary discussion contained on pages 1251 and 1252 
of 68 A.L.R. 2nd, which will be specifically referred to 
later. The Court's attention is also called to a discussion 
of this matter in the case of West Virginia v. Memorial 
Gardens Develop·ment Corporation (W. V a. 1957), 101 
S.E. 2nd 425, 437-438 (Post) where numerous authorities 
are referred to holding pre-need and burial contracts as 
insurance contracts and subject to regulation under in-
surance laws. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT IV. 
THAT CONTRARY TO THE LOWER 
COURT'S DECISION, THOSE PORTIONS OF 
SECTIONS 22-4-1. 22-4-2, 22-4-3, 22-4-4, 22-4-5 
and 22-4-7 of THE PRE-NEED LAW OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, CHAPTER 39 OF THE 1955 
LAWS OF UTAH AS A~IENDED BY CHAP-
TER 45 OF THE 1957 LAWS OF UTAH AND 
WHICH SECTIONS ARE QUOTED I~ THE 
T_JOWER COURT'S AMENDED JUDGMENT 
OF DISMISSAL, DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 
1964 (R. 46) ARE CONSTITUTIONAL. 
The corporate Defendants have attacked Utah's pre-
need law as being unconstitutional on the ground that it 
is not a valid exercise of the police power. There arc 
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cases holding as the Defendants urge that such statutes 
are invalid, however,. the substantial numerical weight 
of authority upholds such statutes as being proper and 
necessary to protect the public against abuses arising 
from the sale of services and personal property to be de-
livered at a future date long after they may be completely 
paid for. The danger to the public from permitting the 
unregulated sale of funeral services far ahead of the time 
they are going to be performed is obvious. It would be 
an open invitation to fraud.. Furthermore, in the case of 
even the most ethical and honest of companies, their fi-
nancial stability cannot be presumed for the indefinite 
f'uture. Regulation of this type of activity appears to be 
in the public interest fully as much as is regulation of 
banks or insurance companies. 
The constitutionality of pre-need laws has been test-
ed in several cases in several different states. The stat-
utes in most, if not all, of these states were substantially 
the same as the Utah statute {Chapter 39, La\\"'S of Utah 
1955, and as amended in Chapter 45, Laws of Utah 1957). 
The· states have not been uniform in their decisions. 
A statute similar to ·our Utah statute ''Tas involved in 
the case of Memorial Gardens Association, Inc. v. Smith 
(TIL 19~9), 156 N.E. 2nd 578. The Court discusses gen-
erally the need of regulation to protect depositors, where 
no immediate sale is involved but performance in the 
fut,ure is involved, and security provided for by law is 
proper regulation. The Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of .the pre-need law and stated: 
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"The enactment of Statutes having for their ob-
ject the prevention of fraud, deceit, cheating and 
imposition is_within the Police power of a State.'' 
·The State of Texas also. upheld the constitutionality 
of a pre-need statute similar to Utah's in the case of 
Falk'fber v. Memorial Gardens Association, (Texas 1957), 
298 S.W. 2nd 934. It held it wa.s regulatory only and 
not prohibitive or against public policy. 
One of the main, if not the main case relied upon by 
the Defendants in the lower Court was the case of Sta.te 
of West Virginia v. Memorial Garden-s Development Cor-
poration. (W.Va. 1958), 101 S.E. 2nd 425; 68 A.L.R. 2nd 
1233. It held a Statute also similar to our Utah Statute 
as unconstitutional. It is really disturbing to find that 
after several pages .of discussion the West Virginia Court 
said: 
''Purchasers of property or services can ascer-
tain, if they so desire, the reputation .of the sellers 
and their financial condition, and if they do not, 
it is not the fault of the State, if any loss to them 
should ensue'' (Page 431). 
The Court then went farther and argued that parties 
should be left to themselves in making contracts, a1Hl 
that ''even though it was popular to enact laws protect-
ing the unsuspecting and incompetent in their purchases 
gullibly made,'' (page 431), very, very few classes of busi-
ness should be regulated and sales of funeral 'Contracts 
least of all. The dissenting opinion in the West Virginia 
case is extremely well written. It elaborates on the mat-
ter just referred to by the Plaintiffs as to what rlasses of 
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business should be regulated and, contrary to the main 
opinion, the dissenting· opinion shows how extensive reg-
ulation of business has become, and how well accepted 
and advisable it is. The Texas Court in the case of Falk-
ner v. Memorial Gardens Associalion, supra, cites and 
follows the dissenting opinion in the West Virginia case 
and says: 
'' * * * There was a vigorous dissent from the 
opinion which we believe contains the better rea-
soning and is more in accord with the general Ju-
dicial precedent upon the question.'' 
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado has also 
ruled their pre-need law unconstitutional in the case of 
Memorial Tru.sts, Inc., v. Berry (Colo. 1960), 356 Pac. 
2nd 884. 
The cases on this question are collected in 68 A.L.R. 
2nd 1251-55. The West Virginia case is also in this 
A.L.R. citation on pages 1233-1251. 
SUl\IMARY 
The Plaintiffs respectfully request this Honorable 
Court to reverse the decision of the lower Court de-
claring: 
(1) Any funeral director or embalmer, who per-
forms funeral services or furnishes burial facilities pur-
suant to a pre-need contract obtained by solicitation by 
any of the Defendants, solicited or sold by and for them-
selves, or which results to the benefit of a funeral di-
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rector or embalmer who performs the funeral services or 
furnishes the burial facilities causes said Defendants to 
become his agent and is guilty of unprofessional and un-
ethical conduct as defined in Sections 5~-9-10 and 58-9-22 
of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
(2) That contracts sold by the Defendants are all 
subject to the pre-need law of Utah, and the Contract used 
and issued by the Defendant Me:rp.orial Trust, Inc., is par-
ticularly in violation of the pre-need law of the State of 
Utah as contained in Section 22-4-4, Chapter 39, Laws of 
Utah, ~955, and as amended in Chapter 45, Laws of Utah, 
1957, and that said Defendants' pre-need contract partic-
ularly permits said Defendant to demand and receive 
the earnings of the Trust Funds and pay said funds to 
said Defendant contrary to the provisions of Section 
22-4-4 aforesaid. 
( 3) That the pre-need contracts, being sold by the 
Defendant companies and which are the subjects of con-
troversy in this case, are insurance contracts and subject 
to the insurance laws of this State and therefore, subject 
to regulation by the Utah State Insurance Department, 
and that the said Defendant companies, issuing said Con-
tracts are also subject as Insurance Companies to the In-
surance Laws of Utah and the regulations of the State 
Insurance Department of the State of Utah. If this Hon-
orable Court finds as requested in Point III, it is then 
conceded that the Defendants thereby made subject to the 
Insurance laws and regulations, would not be suhject to 
the pre-need law as requested in Point II. 
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( 4) Tha.t those portions of Sections 22-4-1, 22-4-2, 
22-4-3, 22-4-4, 22-4-5 and 22-4-7 of the Pre-need Law of the 
State of Utah, Chapter 39 of the 1955 Laws of Utah as 
amended by Chapter 45 of the 1957 L·aws of Utah and 
which sections are quoted in the Lower Courts Amended 
Judgment of Dismissal, dated September 18, 1964 (R. 46) 
are constitutional. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C.N.OTTOSEN 
CALVIN L. RAMPTON 
of PUGSLEY, HALES, RAMPTON 
& WATKISS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
A ppellan.ts 
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